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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The aim of the article is to present the concept of intentio operis, which 
was developed by Umberto Eco for considering intention in the interpretation 
of literary texts. In the way Eco understands it, intentio operis is meant to 
function as a form of restraint on the interpreter’s far-reaching inclinations 
regarding the text. It is also, paradoxically, a certain way of revealing the au-
thor’s intentions. This Italian semiologist, writer and publicist, while being an 
author himself, was at the same time opposed to giving the author power over 
his or her text. He thought that upon its completion, a text becomes separated 
from its author and lives a life of its own in the subsequent interpretations 
of its readers (interpreters). Eco’s ideas on interpretation1 evolved in terms 
of the reader’s (interpreter’s) activity. They were not, however, extreme. He 
did not agree that the interpreter had unrestrained freedom to eliminate the 
author completely. To him, a text was not a picnic to which ‘the author brings 
the words and the reader brings the sense’.2 What is consistent in Eco’s ap-
proach to interpretation, is his demand that the text be respected as a creation 
of its author.
An analysis of Eco’s idea of interpretation in the universal context (without 
limiting it to literary texts) reveals many elements analogous to the practice 
of legal interpretation.3 One of these elements is the aforementioned idea of 
intentio operis. On the one hand, this refers to the approach of structuralist se-
mantics to the text, in terms of its surface structure and deep structure (which 
also applies to legal text), and on the other, it concerns the pragmalinguistic 
categories of the communicative competences possessed by the participants of 
1 Eco identifies interpretation with understanding. 
2 This famous passage has often been mistakenly claimed as authored by Todorov (1987): 12, 
e.g. as Eco (1992a: 24) claims. According to Szajnert (2011): 133, the real author of this passage
is Frye (1968).
3 At least in the derivative conception of legal interpretation, which was fully expounded by 
Zieliński (2002).
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the interpretive process, which is the implicit premise of interpretative direc-
tives in the derivative conception of legal interpretation.
In a previous monograph, I have already presented possible applications 
of some of the solutions proposed by Eco that bring the ‘derivational’ and prag-
malinguistic approaches to legal interpretation closer together.4 In this ar-
ticle, I present Eco’s deployment of intentio operis as an attempt to transcend 
the opposition between authorial intention and interpretive freedom, with the 
hope that this will prove beneficial to legal interpretation. 
II. WE HAVE TO RESPECT THE TEXT5
It seems that Eco’s most important rule of textual interpretation is respect 
for the text. The text is approached from the perspective of the receiver. Since 
Eco’s conception of interpretation is grounded in semiotics, a text is for him 
a ‘syntactic-semantico-pragmatic device’,6 the consequence of which is the no-
tion of textual cooperation as an interpretive strategy. 
According to Eco, on its surface level a text comprises a chain of expres-
sive devices that are actualized by the reader (interpreter). This actualisation 
involves, in Eco’s words, opening the dictionary for every encountered word. 
This ‘opening of the dictionary’ implies that the reader consider not only the 
semantic issues but also the linguistic context in which the word has been 
used, in order to choose the most suitable sense from all the possible ones. 
The reader encounters an additional difficulty in the fact that a text, as 
Eco conceives it, is not only a complex way of knowing but also an incomplete 
one. The incompleteness of a text is rooted in the fact that not everything that 
comprises a text has been explicitly uttered (it has not been uttered on the 
surface). This ‘utterance’ of what has not been ‘uttered’ on the surface (and 
therefore actualized in the text) happens in the process of actualization. In 
this process of actualization, Eco sees the reader (interpreter) as having an ac-
tive role, while being nonetheless orientated on cooperating with the text, not 
on complete freedom or discretion in interpretation,7 which he stated expressis 
verbis: ‘I agree with the statement that a text can take on multiple meanings. 
I disagree that it can take on all the meanings.’8
What does this cooperation between the reader (interpreter) and the text 
involve? The Italian semiologist asserts that a text communicates something 
not just to anyone, but to someone who actualizes this text, which requires 
certain skills. The meaning generated by a text and interpreted by the read-
er (receiver) is not based solely on the linguistic code, even though it can be 
4 Choduń (2018).
5 Eco, (1992b): 182. 
6 Eco (1979a): 3.
7 For more, see Eco (1979b).
8 Eco (1992c): 141.
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a source of problems if the text and the reader (interpreter) do not share 
a common code. As Eco writes, it requires not only linguistic competence, but 
also competence in the broader situational sense, activating mechanisms of 
presupposition, suppressing individual resentments, and so forth.9
Cooperation from the reader (interpreter) is the condition of actualization, 
postulated by the text itself. A text, according to Eco, ‘foresees’ the person it 
is written for, as the appropriate reader (interpreter). Of course a text does 
not create itself, but is created by the author and this author, with the help 
of certain devices, creates a textual strategy that foresees certain readers’ ac-
tions towards this text. At this point, Eco invokes the concept of competences 
(in plural). They include not only linguistic competence but also, understood 
more broadly, communicative competence and even cultural competence. The 
author must then assume that the competences of the reader (interpreter) will 
match those of the author. And all of this, as a textual strategy, is generated 
by the text itself. Neither the author of a text nor its reader (interpreter) are 
understood by Eco empirically. It is not about the competences of a particular 
author or a particular reader. As was mentioned before, these are certain tex-
tual strategies that are present in the text in a way that generates the author 
as ‘the Model Author’ and the reader as ‘the Model Reader’. The empirical 
author achieves this with the help of various linguistic, lexical and stylistic 
devices, the choice of genre, the choice of subject, and so on. Based on this 
repertoire of devices, the empirical author not only assumes that the text is 
written for a particular reader (interpreter) with particular competences, but 
also actually postulates such a reader (interpreter) by producing the text in 
this particular way. This of course all relates to the Model Reader. 
Both the Model Author and the Model Reader are textual strategies that 
Eco introduced in order to present textual cooperation as an ‘actualisation 
of intentions virtually contained in the utterance’.10 At the same time, Eco 
argues, the empirical author does not hold a privileged interpretive position 
towards his or her own text, ‘but becomes a potential model reader offering 
possible explanations for his or her creation’.11 
These textual strategies do not come from nowhere, however. They are 
generated by the text, through the empirical author. This empirical author 
formulates hypotheses about the Model Reader, and at the same time, us-
ing a certain repertoire of devices, designates himself or herself as the Model 
Author. This way, both the Model Reader (interpreter) and the Model Author 
are manifested as certain textual strategies. The textual strategy of the Model 
Author allows the empirical reader to formulate a hypothesis of the Model Au-
thor. In this regard, Eco argues that the empirical reader is much more likely 
to successfully formulate a hypothesis regarding the Model Author than the 
empirical author is to formulate a hypothesis of the Model Reader. According 
to the author of Lector in fabula, the latter must postulate what does not yet 
 9 Cf. Eco (1979b).
10 Eco (1979b): 63.
11 For more, see Bondanella (1997): 143.
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exist and realize it in a range of textual operations; the former, on the other 
hand, formulates a certain typical image from what has already existed as an 
utterance and is textually present as a statement.12
The aim of a text then, according to Eco, is to produce a reader (interpret-
er) who will read the text as it is ‘programmed’ to be read. 
III. INTENTIO AUCTORIS, INTENTIO LECTORIS,  
INTENTIO OPERIS
The introduction of the Model Author and the Model Reader was a way 
of shifting the issue of interpretation from the focus on the author and the 
reader (interpreter) to the focus on the text. ‘The classical debate aimed at 
finding in a text either what its author intended to say or what the text 
said independently intentions of its author. Only after accepting the second 
horn of this dilemma can one ask if what is find is what the text says by 
virtue of its textual coherence and of an original underlying signification 
system, or what the addresses found in it by virtue of their own systems of 
expectations.’13 
As was explored above (Section II), a text generates the Model Author and 
the Model Reader (interpreter). The text is their medium, so to speak. There-
fore, the act (process) of interpretation comprises three elements: the Model 
Author, the Model Reader, and the text, which plays two roles. The text is in 
fact a way of knowing, as a text of a specific genre (literary or other), and at 
the same time a source of knowledge regarding the textual strategies of the 
author and the reader (interpreter). 
On the one hand, it seems that the text is the central category here, but 
on the other, it is the reader (interpreter) to whom the ‘last’ word belongs. The 
need to limit the unrestrained interpretive freedom of the reader (interpret-
er), while denying the author full control over the text – this eternal conflict 
between the authorial intention and the reader’s (interpreter’s) freedom re-
quired that a compromise be found. Eco thus introduced three types of inten-
tion: intentio operis (the intention of the text), intentio lectoris (the intention of 
the reader) and intentio auctoris (the intention of the author) – in an attempt 
to achieve this compromise. The compromise was understood by him as ‘a dia-
lectical link between intentio operis and intentio lectoris’.14 
The intention of the text refers to the internal structure of a text given to 
the reader at the exact time when the text enters circulation (what the text 
wants to say in the deep structure of its meanings). It breaks away from the 
empirical author, who in Eco’s notion is not an element in the act (process) 
12 It is worth noting that the problem is different in relation to highly conventionalized texts. 
These are the texts that use specific and set linguistic formulas akin to language clichés that de-
termine both the Model Reader and the Model Author. For more, see Eco (1979b). 
13 Eco (1992b): 63–64.
14 Eco (1992b): 64.
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of interpretation.15 As Eco states, ‘to recognise the intentio operis is to recog-
nise a semiotic strategy.’16 The intention of the reader is understood here as 
a contribution to the interpretation of the text. Intentio lectoris, however, does 
not imply that the reader (interpreter) has unrestricted flexibility in terms of 
meaning making. It involves their competences regarding ‘decoding codes’17 
and the conventions underlying the text. The last element is the intention of 
the author. This third type of intention proposed by Eco refers to the intention 
of the empirical author. Generally, it could be said that intentio auctoris refers 
to ‘what the empirical author intended to say’.
Between the prima facie irrelevant intentio auctoris and the potentially 
untamed intentio lectoris, Eco postulates the presence of intentio operis. The 
intention of the text serves as a check on the interpretive freedom of the em-
pirical reader (interpreter), beyond which his or her interpretation will be-
come an overinterpretation. The text itself is thus a parameter used to vali-
date all possible interpretations of the text. Eco is consistent in his thesis 
that the characteristics of the text itself impose limits on permissible inter-
pretations: ‘To establish how a text works is to establish which of its various 
aspects are or may become relevant or essential for a coherent interpretation, 
and which remain on the margin and prevent coherent interpretation.’18 In-
tentio operis functions as a link (or intermediary) between the intention of the 
author, whose imprint it bears, and limiting the infinite number of potential 
interpretations made by the empirical reader (interpreter).
From the perspective of the empirical author, who chooses a specific com-
municative strategy,19 he or she generates intentio operis in the text. From the 
perspective of the empirical reader (interpreter), intentio operis provides all 
possible interpretations of the text while relating them to the Model Reader. 
This shows that intentio operis is simultaneously a cause (basis, reason) of the 
results of interpretation and a set of all the possible senses of a given text. In-
tentio operis, according to Eco, includes all the potential interpretations, some 
of which actualize during the interpretation process performed by the empiri-
cal reader (interpreter). The empirical reader (interpreter) generates from the 
text some results of interpretation inherent in it, but does not exhaust them. 
The result of interpretation depends to a large extent on the degree to which 
the empirical reader (interpreter) resembles the Model Reader (with regard 
15 As Eco (1992b: 65) admits: ‘I realise that in this dialectics between the intention of the 
reader and the intention of the text the intention of the empirical author has been totally disre-
garded.’
16 Eco (1992b): 64.
17 Eco does not equate decoding with interpretation. To him, interpretation is ‘understanding 
basis of some on the previous decoding, the general sense of a vast portion of discourse’ Eco (1975): 
185, as cited in Bondanella (1997): 85. Decoding relates to reading a given utterance (text) based 
on a complex set of rules that make up a given code. A code is a structure that evolves in a model. 
Specific utterances that realize this structure become communicative precisely in relation to it. 
For more, see Eco (1968): 304–306. ‘Decoding’ an utterance requires communicative competence, 
not only linguistic competence.
18 Eco (1992): 146.
19 Through which he or she transforms into the Model Author.
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to the level of competence in the area of textual interpretation), and to what 
extent he or she fulfils the requirements of the Model Reader.
Due to the fact that Eco, by focusing on the link between the Model Reader 
and the text, to an extent eliminates the empirical author, a question arises: 
what is the role of intentio auctoris? Intentio auctoris, after all, has been some-
what ‘absorbed’ by intentio operis. While it is clear that when it comes to inten-
tio auctoris Eco largely disregards the relevance of the psychological state of 
the author, it is not so clear whether he eliminates the empirical author with 
regard to the circumstances, conditions, and the cultural context of the text. 
IV. A LEGAL TEXT AND INTENTIO OPERIS
The text of a legal act is a conventionalized text. Its writing style depends 
on the directives of the regulations regarding legislative technique.20 This is 
not the case with other types of text, particularly literary texts. From the 
start, the text of a legal act is therefore created in accordance with a specific 
strategy related to its reading. The creator of the text of a legal act (legislative 
drafter) cannot ignore these directives. The very directives governing the cre-
ation of the texts of legal acts thus formulate a certain strategy of writing in 
line with Eco’s Model Author. At the same time, such a conventionalized way 
of creating a text means that the given text of a legal act is a realization of the 
normative model for this type of text. 
Such a text can be certainly read in multiple ways, generated by the text 
itself. For an interpreter-historian it can be a text conveying some historical 
information (at the level of presupposition);21 for an interpreter-linguist it can 
be a text in a given language, which can be looked at from the perspective of 
its grammatical, lexical or orthographic correctness. For an interpreter-law-
yer, the above approaches can be useful in the process of interpreting the texts 
of legal acts but are not determined and anticipated by the textual strategy 
contained in those texts (i.e. the types of texts that are texts of legal acts). In 
the textual model determined by the directives related to writing texts of legal 
acts, such a strategy is already contained in an abstract way. It realizes itself 
in the text of a specific legal act and actualizes in the process of interpreta-
tion. It concerns both the structure of the text and the potential senses of the 
words used in the text. It is precisely in the example of the texts of legal acts 
that we can see the illusion of the surface structure and that which links with 
their ‘literal’ reading. We are not concerned with this kind of reading of a text, 
however, but with reaching the deep structure – in line with what the model 
text presupposes and what the text of a legal act is modelled on. 
20 It concerns a set of directives that determine the textual standards of the texts of legal 
acts, which are often articulated as legal regulations in a legal act, similarly to the set of direc-
tives regarding writing Polish texts of legal acts. 
21 Cf. Sarkowicz (1995).
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Due to the degree of conventionalization of the text of a legal act, the (em-
pirical) interpreter need not build hypotheses regarding the textual strategy 
(identified with the genre of the utterance). Awareness of what the texts iden-
tified as texts of legal acts look like is common, especially since the very title 
of the text of a legal act reveals this information. 
An accurate reading of the text of a legal act, though, requires specific 
competences in this area, competences not possessed by a ‘naive reader’. The 
pool of such competences is postulated by the text itself. The production of this 
text, after all, assumed that the interpreter of the text would possess adequate 
knowledge and skills to accurately read this type of text, including the given 
specific text. 
Intentio operis of the texts of legal acts presupposes the interpreter’s com-
petence regarding reading not only the overt content of the text, but also ev-
erything that has not been explicitly expressed but will be read as if it exists 
in the text. A good example of such a situation is the fact that the interpreter 
must bring to the process of interpretation a legal definition present in a dif-
ferent text from the one being interpreted, even if the text itself does not evoke 
another text of a legal act.22 And there are many more examples of this kind. 
But the ‘naive interpreter’ is not aware of these techniques of producing texts 
of legal acts, even though they are written into the interpretive strategy of the 
texts of legal acts, or, as Eco would put it, into their intentio operis.
Intentio operis is a cooperative textual strategy between the interpreter 
and the text, which already recognizes the role of the empirical author. With 
regard to the texts of legal acts, identifying the author (empirical authors), 
although possible, is not always certain. It could be representatives, profes-
sional legislative drafters, or authorized legal entities. These issues have 
often been raised in the scholarship. Considering the level of the convention-
alization of the text of a legal act, however, the need to identify the author 
seems redundant, especially when considering that variability is an intrinsic 
element of the texts of legal acts. The number of empirical authors would 
increase exponentially. The dominant opinion in jurisprudence is that the 
author of the text of a legal act should not be seen as an empirical author 
but rather as a legislator, understood as a theoretical-legal construct. This 
conventional approach to the legislator also generates a range of problems, 
for example when one evokes the ‘will of the legislator’, understood as an 
empirical entity. 
Similar concerns can be raised with regard to intentio operis. How can we 
be sure that the ‘intention of the text’ actually exists? From the psychological 
perspective the answer is certainly ‘we cannot’, likewise regarding the inten-
tion of the author. Eco was opposed to evoking the intention of the empirical 
author. He thought that such an approach would be ineffective and misplaced, 
which he justified as follows: ‘If we were to accept my idea of textual interpre-
tation as the discovery of a strategy intended to produce a Model Reader – 
22 This happens for example with regard to the definitions contained in acts fundamental to 
a specific type of cases.
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conceived as the ideal counterpart of a Model Author (which appears only 
as a textual strategy) – then the notion of an empirical author’s intention 
becomes fundamentally useless.’23 
V. CONCLUSION
According to Eco, every author presupposes the existence of a model of 
their hypothetical reader, whose task is to closely cooperate with the author 
in the process of textual interpretation. Eco rejects the privileged position of 
the intention of the author and instead introduces the Model Author as a com-
municative textual strategy that determines the interpretive process for the 
reader (interpreter). The Model Reader is a textual strategy steeped in the 
text that serves as a restraint on the empirical interpreter, according to the 
presumed principles of each textual genre. 
Eco looks at interpretation from the perspective of the reader (interpret-
er), which makes the process of textual understanding more dynamic and is 
consistent with his claim that a text can have multiple senses. This seems 
obvious not only in relation to literary texts, if interpretation is treated as 
a dynamic process determined by the moment in time when the interpretation 
is taking place, which means that a different moment may produce a different 
result of interpretation (sense of the text). 
Despite accepting the point of view of the reader (interpreter), Eco does 
not allow for unrestricted freedom in his or her interpretation. The key word 
here is ‘competence regarding interpreting specific types of texts’, and there-
fore each particular text as a text belonging to a specific type of text. ‘Every 
act [of interpretation] is therefore a difficult interaction between the reader’s 
competence (his awareness of the world) and the competence postulated by 
a given text.’24 Despite the different names Eco uses to identify textual strate-
gies, what matters in the process of interpretation is not intentions but com-
petences (communicative, cultural, and especially competences regarding tex-
tual interpretation).25
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REGARDING INTENTIO OPERIS IN THE TEXTS OF LEGAL ACTS
S u m m a r y
The aim of the paper is to present intentio operis as an interpretative strategy created by a text. 
According to Umberto Eco, this strategy can help to transcend the opposition between intentio 
auctoris and the interpreter’s unrestrained freedom. Although as a concept intentio operis belongs 
to literary texts, it seems to be an interesting construct to apply to legal interpretation, especially 
because it links different points of view on textual interpretation: the structural (‘how the text is 
constructed’) and the pragmatic (namely aspects of communication, such as the communicative 
intentions of the empirical author, the communicative intentions of the text).
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